The War America Cannot Win: How Washington’s Iran Gamble Backfired — Politically, Militarily, and Ideologically
CSS CURRENT AFFAIRS — INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The War America Cannot Win: How Washington’s Iran Gamble Backfired — Politically, Militarily, and Ideologically How the assassination of Ali Khamenei reunited a divided Iran, elevated a dynasty it meant to destroy, and handed Tehran a narrative more powerful than any missile CSS Corner · csscorner.online · March 23, 2026 · Topics: International Relations · Iran · US Foreign Policy · CSS Essay Preparation There is an old principle in statecraft, ignored at enormous cost by those who fancy themselves architects of history: when you strike a nation on its soil, kill its leader during its holiest month, and bomb its schools and hospitals — do not expect its people to greet you as liberators. In late February 2026, the United States and Israel launched what Trump called “major combat operations” against Iran, assassinating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, degrading its military infrastructure, and, in their own stated framing, expecting Iranians to rise up and dismantle the Islamic Republic themselves. Four weeks later, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, oil prices have surged over 45 percent, the global economy teeters on the edge of recession, Trump is talking about “winding down” — and Iran has a new supreme leader who is, ideologically, more hardline than the last. This is not a military victory. This is a strategic catastrophe unfolding in slow motion. And for CSS aspirants preparing to engage with international relations, foreign policy, and contemporary affairs, understanding why America is losing this war — politically and militarily — is not just academically important. It is essential. CORE ARGUMENT Washington went to war against a country of 92 million people with no plan for what came after the strikes. It assassinated a leader whose death, paradoxically, gifted the regime its most powerful tool: the martyr’s narrative. When a nation’s identity is threatened from outside, ideology — however unpopular — becomes the last fortress people are willing to defend. The Illusion of Surgical Dominance On paper, the opening weeks looked like an overwhelming American success. Iranian missile launches dropped sharply. The navy was devastated. Nuclear infrastructure was struck in a separate operation dubbed “Midnight Hammer.” The U.S. Department of Defense claimed Iranian drone and missile attacks had fallen by 90 percent from peak levels. Trump declared objectives “ahead of schedule.” But military degradation and strategic victory are not the same thing. The IAEA’s director-general, Rafael Grossi, confirmed what analysts had feared: even after heavy bombardment, Iran’s nuclear enrichment material and residual capabilities remain. The uranium did not disappear. The knowledge did not vanish. And the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — a decentralised, ideologically hardened force embedded across the state and society — was never going to collapse simply because its top tier was killed. More damaging still is the Strait of Hormuz. Iran closed it on the first day of the war, and it has remained effectively shut to its enemies ever since. Over 3,000 vessels are stranded in a maritime parking lot stretching across the Persian Gulf. One in every five barrels of global oil supply passes through this 21-mile-wide chokepoint. Crude oil has now crossed $110 per barrel. Kuwait’s Mina al-Ahmadi refinery — one of the largest in the Middle East — was struck by Iranian drones. Saudi Arabia intercepted 47 drones in a single three-hour period. Iranian missiles reached Diego Garcia, 2,500 miles from Iranian shores. Iran fired at Dimona, Israel’s nuclear facility, injuring over 180 people. This is not the behaviour of a regime on the verge of collapse. $110+ Crude oil per barrel (March 2026) 3,000+ Vessels stranded in the Gulf 5,300+ Iranian military killed (est.) 1,444+ Iranian civilians killed incl. 204 children “Iran does not need to score major military successes every day. The regime only needs to inflict enough periodic damage to keep regional partners, markets, and the American public jittery.” — Nate Swanson, Former NSC Iran Director, Foreign Affairs, March 17, 2026 No Plan, No Endgame: The Political Collapse of Washington’s Strategy Perhaps the most scathing indictment of American strategy is the incoherence of its objectives. Trump began the war saying victory would come when Iranians rose up and overthrew the Islamic Republic themselves — a request that the former NSC Iran director Nate Swanson described bluntly as “extraordinary and unrealistic.” When that did not happen, the administration reframed its goals: degrade missile capability, destroy the navy and air force, prevent nuclear weapons, protect Israel. Then Trump hinted at “winding down.” Then he threatened to “obliterate” Iran’s power plants if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened in 48 hours. Then he postponed those strikes for five days, citing “productive talks.” Then 2,500 additional Marines were dispatched to the region. The shifting narratives tell their own story. This is not the behaviour of a state prosecuting a war with defined, achievable ends. It is the behaviour of a president who started a fire without a plan for putting it out. Congressional Republicans are now urging Trump to “declare victory and move on” — a damning phrase that itself concedes no actual victory has been achieved. Republican Representative Tim Burchett captured the mood with stark honesty: “I think we need to find an exit strategy as fast as possible.” Meanwhile, Trump’s earlier expressed preference for who should lead Iran — publicly dismissing Mojtaba Khamenei as “a lightweight” and “unacceptable” — had precisely the opposite effect intended. To a regime with its back against the wall, foreign interference in its succession process was not a deterrent. It was a provocation. Within days of Trump’s comments and Israeli Defence Minister Katz’s threat to assassinate any newly chosen leader, the Assembly of Experts elected Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader. Washington’s pressure had transformed a constitutionally dubious, dynastically questionable appointment into an act of national defiance. ★ CSS EXAM TIP — ESSAY ANGLE This is a textbook example of the “boomerang effect” in foreign policy — a concept examiners love. When external pressure meant to coerce a regime into compliance instead triggers
ESSAY: THE DEMAND OF NEW PROVINCES IN PAKISTAN REVERBERATES AS A POPULIST SHIBBOLETH
I. IntroductionIn 2012, a committee was formed under Senator Farahtullah Babar to conduct a survey…. II. Thesis StatementAlthough the creation of new provinces in Pakistan is widely regarded as a panacea for governance issues, the current demand is a recurring shibboleth that masks institutional decay, lacks political will, serves as an electoral tool, and overlooks the financial burden. III. Conceptual Understanding of Key Terms: Populist and Shibboleth IV. A Counterperspective: The Creation of New Provinces as a Panacea for Governance Issues V. Demand of New Provinces in Pakistan is a Recurring Populist Shibboleth A. Serves as an electoral tool B. Exploits the core-periphery sentiments C. Ignores fiscal and economic burden D. Neglects the risks of national disintegration and ethnic-based violenceE. Lacks genuine political will to devolve power F. Oversimplifies the rigid process of making a province given under Article 239(4) G. Unwillingness of bureaucracy to transfer power H. Masks structural faultlines of Pakistan’s polity I. Neglects historical pattern of non-implementation J. Lacks practical plan of assets division K. Reflects unrealistic public expectations L. Conflicts with the founding father’s vision M. Contradicts with Islamic concept of brotherhood VI. The Rational Pathway Beyond the Shibboleth A. Empower the local government B. Ensure economic equality VII. Conclusion In 2012, a committee was formulated under Senator Farahtullah Babar to conduct a survey and draft a plan to carve a new province in Southern Punjab. The committee did extensive work and submitted a report to the National Assembly. That report was converted to a resolution and passed unanimously by the National Assembly, yet no steps were taken after the 2013 General Elections. This debate again resurfaced on the political landscape during the 2018 elections. Politicians made promises to make a southern province within a hundred days after coming to power, yet no constitutional steps were taken. This chronic disparity between electoral pledges and legislative inaction reveals a calculated pattern of political maneuvering. Is it not, therefore, a recurring populist shibboleth? Is this narrative not serving as an electoral tool that helps politicians secure power? Although the creation of new provinces in Pakistan is widely regarded as a panacea for governance issues, the current demand is a recurring populist shibboleth that masks institutional decay, lacks genuine political will, serves as an electoral tool, and overlooks the financial burden.Nowadays, politicians are using the popular slogan of new provinces to portray that they really care about people. The demand for new provinces has been directly linked with emotions, making it a populist narrative. However, it is a shibboleth. Shibboleth means a hollow slogan, a catchy phrase, and empty promises. Populist leaders have used this slogan so many times that it has become a populist shibboleth. People have started believing in this catchy phrase without even analysing the practicability and implications of the idea. The politicians keep saying the word “New Provinces,” but they have no real road map, no constitutional homework, and no intention to actually follow through.Many experts consider the creation of new provinces in Pakistan as the need of an hour. Proponents such as Mian Amir, an educationist, claim that creating new provinces is the best solution to address the administrative issues. According to them, smaller units enhance governance and devolve power to the grass root level. More provinces mean better governance. They argue that the creation of new provinces will help in ensuring law and order, improving health services, and promoting education in backward areas which are neglected owing to the large size of present provinces. Though they are correct that many areas are underdeveloped in the large provinces, they oversimplified the issue of governance. In the present time, the demand for new provinces serves as an electoral tool instead of genuine concern for people. Politicians exploit the emotions and grievances of masses by making empty promises during electoral campaigns regarding the creation of new provinces to secure their vote bank. Farahtullah Babar, for instance, raised the concern in the parliament by arguing that Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) won thirty out of fifty parliamentary seats from the Saraiki belt on the promise of making a separate province. However, in 2018, when PTI came to power, no constitutional steps were taken in this regard. The same is the case with other political parties. Every party makes promises but never fulfills them. They just secure power by using the new provinces narrative as an electoral tool. So, is it not a populist shibboleth?Likewise, politicians exploit the peripheries — areas away from the provincial capital — sentiments by citing the large size of provinces as a hurdle in the way of delivering services. In reality, they are hiding their own maladministration and lack of will to devolve power. Moosakhel, for example, is the poorest district of Pakistan. It is neglected because the provincial government merely focuses on Quetta. The same is the case with areas like Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab. Lahore is developed; Dera Ghazi Khan is underdeveloped. However, whenever election campaigns start, all parties go to the underdeveloped areas and ensure peripheries a better future through the creation of new provinces. Therefore, such a recurring pattern shows that the demand for creating new provinces has become a shibboleth, and everyone started believing the politicians’ words without having a plan analysing implications.Similarly, people and politicians overlook the financial burden of carving new provinces. Both stakeholders just frequently chant the slogan without estimating the economic cost of establishing new units. It is not as simple as people perceive it. It is not like the construction of roads and parks. Rather, creating new provinces demands a hefty amount. The federal government has to create new courts, bureaucratic infrastructure, and parliament that require a large amount of money. It will place stress on the already fragile economy of Pakistan. Nigeria’s case serves as the best example. Nigeria started with only three regions but now it has thirty-six units. Instead of making governance better, new units placed stress on the federal government. Seventy to eighty percent of the budget is spent